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HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AND
THE OBJECTIVE REASONABLENESS
CONUNDRUM: DERIVING A WORKABLE
FRAMEWORK FROM TORT LAW FOR
ADDRESSING KNOWING HARASSMENT
OF HYPERSENSITIVE EMPLOYEESt
FRANK S. RAVITCH*
Ms. Smith works for a supervisor who does not believe women
belong in the workplace. He wants to force her out, but based on the
company's harassment policy, he knows he cannot subject her to con-
duct that a reasonable person would find severe or pervasive, because
that would be illegal discrimination, and his employer would likely take
action against him. However, he also knows that she is particularly
sensitive to loud noise. She cannot function around loud noise, and
becomes extremely nervous. This has never been a problem, because
the office is relatively quiet, and she can tolerate short bursts of noise.
In an effort to make working conditions unbearable for her, he decides
to speak loudly whenever he is near her office, and several other male
employees do the same. He also sets up a new photocopying machine,
which makes a lot of noise, close to her office. He never makes a sexual
or gender-based comment in the office, and does not otherwise inter-
fere with Ms. Smith's working conditions. The noise, however, substan-
tially interferes with her work, causes her to have several emotional
outbursts in the office, and finally a nervous breakdown. She knows
that the supervisor is aware of her unusual sensitivity, and that she was
subject to the noise due to her gender—a friend overheard the super-
visor joking about it with another employee.
Under current hostile work environment analysis, Ms. Smith could
not succeed on a claim of harassment, despite the fact that her super-
visor knowingly subjected her to harassment based on her gender.' The
t Copyright 0 1095 Frank S. Kavitch,
* Lecturer in Law, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law. I wish to thank
Professor Michael Gottesman of the Georgetown University Law Center for his invaluable com-
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As will be discussed throughout this Article, this result is a function of the structures applied
to the hostile work environment cause of action by the courts and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370-71 (1003)
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same would be true for employees subjected to harassment aimed at
their sensitivities due to their membership in any class protected under
federal anti-discrimination laws. 2 Anti-discrimination laws fail to pro-
tect these individuals from workplace harassment that affects their
unusual sensitivities because the current legal framework applied to
most workplace harassment claims, hostile work environment, includes
an objective reasonableness standard. 3 Thus, it does not protect indi-
viduals who suffer harassment due to their membership in a protected
class based on objectively unreasonable perceptions and sensitivities,
even when the harasser knew of such sensitivities, This result is incon-
sistent with the purposes of the federal anti-discrimination statutes,
which prohibit discrimination in the terms or conditions of employ-
ment based on membership in a protected class. 4
(setting forth structure to be applied to sexual harassment claims, and recognizing actionability
of hostile work environments aimed at other protected classes); EEOC Proposed Guidelines on
Harassment Based on Race, Color, Religion, Gender, National Origin, Age or Disability, 58 Fed.
Reg. 51,266 (1993) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1609) (proposed Oct 1, 1993) [hereinafter
EEOC Proposed Guidelines] (setting forth a structure for analyzing gender harassment claims,
as well as claims by members of other protected classes), withdrawn, 59 Fed. Reg. 51,396 (Oct.
11, 1994). The withdrawal of the EEOC Proposed Guidelines dues not vitiate the application of
the standards set forth therein to harassment based on race, national origin, religion, gender,
age or disability. See EEOC: Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, 405 Fair Empl,
Prac. Man. (BNA) 7165, 7170 (issued Mar. 8, 1994) (noting applicability of standard virtually
identical to hostile work environment standard set forth in proposed guidelines on harassment
based on race, religion, gender, national origin, age or disability).
2 The hostile work environment cause of action applies to harassment aimed at classes
protected under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-17 (West 1981 & Supp. 1994)
[hereinafter Title VII] (applying to race, color, religion, sex and national origin); the Americans
With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West Pamph. 1994) [hereinafter ADA] (ap-
plying to disability); the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-797b (West 1981 & Supp.
1994) [hereinafter Rehabilitation Act] (applying to disability in context of federal employment
and employers with specified relationships to federal government); and the Age Discrimination
In Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634 (West 1981 & Supp. 1994) [hereinafter ADEA]
(applying to age). See also Harris, 114 S. CL at 370-71 (applying hostile work environment cause
of action to sexual harassment); EEOC: Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, 405
Fair Empl, Prac. Man. (BNA) at 7170 (noting applicability of hostile work environment cause of
action to claims based on conduct aimed at individuals due to their race, gender, national origin,
religion, age or disability); EEOC Proposed Guidelines, supra note 1, 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,266
(same).
" The hostile work environment cause of action currently requires that alleged harassing
conduct meet an objective reasonableness standard to be actionable. See Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370
(applying objective reasonableness standard to hostile work environment claim). The objective
reasonableness standard is meant to preclude liability for conduct that would affect only a
hypersensitive employee. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991). The impact of that
standard on harassment aimed at hypersensitive employees will be discussed in more detail infra
at part II.
4 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a) (West 1981 & Stipp. 1994) (prohibiting discrimination in the
terms or conditions of employment based on race, color, gender, religion or national origin); 42
U.S.C.A. § 12112(a) (West Pamph. 1994) (prohibiting same based on disability); 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 623(a) (West 1981 & Supp. 1994) (prohibiting same based on age).
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Sound policy reasons support the inclusion of an objective reason-
ableness standard in the analytical framework applied to hostile work
environment claims. Imposing liability on an employer for harassment
that created a work environment hostile to any hypersensitive em-
ployee who was a member of a protected class, even when the harasser
did not know of the hypersensitivity, would result in rampant and
unpredictable liability for conduct that the alleged harasser could not
have known would offend the victim.' In such cases the conduct could
not be aimed at the victim due to his or her membership in a protected
class, because the harasser could not know the conduct was offensive.
Thus, there would be no discrimination, and it would be inappropriate
to provide the victim redress under a federal anti-discrimination statute. 6
To balance these competing concerns, an analytical framework
must be developed which will provide redress to hypersensitive indi-
viduals knowingly subjected to a hostile work environment based on
membership in a protected class, while protecting employers from
rampant and unpredictable liability. Once such a framework is devel-
oped, the issue of the damages available to hypersensitive harassment
victims must be addressed. The damages issue is relevant both to claims
5 The EEOC has acknowledged that the objective reasonableness standard should shield
employers from liability for "petty slights suffered by the hypersensitive." See EEOC: Policy
Guidance on Sexual Harassment, 405 Fair Empl, Prac. Man. (BNA) 6681, 6689 (issued Mar. 19,
1990); see also Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879 (noting that one purpose of objective reasonableness
standard is to "shield employers from having to accommodate" concerns of hypersensitive em-
ployees).
6 The statement that it would be inappropriate to provide redress to a claimant when the
conduct was not aimed at that claimant. due to his or her membership in a protected class, and
the harasser could not have known that the conduct was offensive to the victim, applies only to
harassment claims by hypersensitive employees brought pursuant to the structure set firth infra
at part II, or a similar framework.
Conduct that is not specifically meant to discriminate based on membership in a protected
class, but which has a discriminatory effect, is actionable under federal anti-discrimination laws.
See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 G.S, 424, 432-33, 436 (1971) (discussing the disparate
impact cause of action). Likewise, conduct can create an objectively hostile work environment
even when those causing the harassment do not realize that the conduct is discriminatory. See
Ellison, 924 F.2d at 880 (conduct can be actionable harassment "even when harassers do not
realize that their conduct creates a hostile working environment"). However, in this latter situation
it could he argued that if conduct_ rises to the level necessary to create an objectively hostile work
environment, the alleged harasser should realize it is discriminatory, especially if his or her
employer has upheld its obligation to sensitize employees to the types of conduct that might
offend a reasonable person who is a member of a protected class, See EEOC Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (1993) (employers should "take all steps
necessary to prevent" harassment including the development of "methods to sensitize all con-
cerned"); EEOC: Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, 405 Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) at
6699 (discussing preventative measures in the harassment context). Failure to uphold that
obligation, or to institute appropriate policies or procedures, can support employer liability for
a hostile work environment. EEOC: Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, 405 Fair Empl. Prac.
Man. (BNA) at 6697-701.
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that would be brought by hypersensitive employees pursuant to this new
framework, and to objectively hostile work environments.' This Article
sets forth an analytical framework for harassment claims brought by
hypersensitive employees. That framework is modeled on the treat-
ment of hypersensitive individuals under the tort theory of intentional
infliction of emotional distress.8 This Article also discusses whether
hypersensitive harassment victims who succeed on a hostile work envi-
ronment claim under the framework set forth herein, or in cases
involving an objectively hostile work environment, should obtain relief
for the exacerbation of an unusual sensitivity.
Part I sets forth the current structure applied to hostile work
environment claims, including employer liability for such claims. Part
I also addresses the differences in the hostile work environment cause
of action as applied to the various classes protected under federal
anti-discrimination laws.
Part II discusses the treatment of hypersensitive employees under
current hostile work environment analysis. Part II then sets forth a
model based on the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress,
which demonstrates when and under what circumstances such indi-
viduals can be protected without imposing an undue burden on em-
ployers.
Part III addresses what damages should be available to a hyper-
sensitive employee who is harassed based on a known hypersensitivity
because of his or her membership in a protected class. It also addresses
whether damages should be available for injury resulting from the
exacerbation of a hypersensitivity caused by an objectively hostile work
environment') when the harasser had no knowledge of the sensitivity.
Part III discusses the applicability of the "eggshell skull" rule to such
situations. 1 °
The measure of damages for injury resulting from objectively hostile work environments
has been addressed. Compensatory damages are available in appropriate circumstances for
violations of Title VII, the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a (West Supp.
1994). However, whether damages should be available for any exacerbation of a victim's unusual
sensitivity resulting from an objectively hostile work environment has not been sufficiently ad-
dressed.
8 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) Sc ant. f (1965) (providing protection to
highly sensitive individuals if actor knew of individual's hypersensitivity and acted anyway). For a
detailed discussion of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress and the treatment of
hypersensitive individuals thereunder, see infra part 11.B.
9 The term "objectively hostile work environment" refers to a work environment that meets
the objective reasonableness standard courts apply to help determine whether a work environ-
ment is actionable. That standard is discussed in detail infra at part I.
In The "eggshell skull" rule, which will be discussed in more depth infra at part Ill, allows a
negligence victim to recover for injury caused by a latent condition regardless of whether the
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I. THE CURRENT STRUCTURE APPLIED TO HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT CLAIMS UNDER FEDERAL ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
STATUTES
The hostile work environment cause of action arises when harass-
ing conduct alters a term or condition of employment based on the
victim's membership in a protected class." The structure of this cause
of action has been evolving since 1971 when the Fifth Circuit first
recognized it in Rogers v. FEOC.I 2 As a matter of general application,
an actionable hostile work environment exists where conduct is aimed
at an employee because of his or her membership in a protected class,
and that conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms
or conditions of employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment—one which an objectively reasonable individual would perceive
to be abusive, and which the victim did perceive to be abusive.'s The
conduct need not seriously affect the employee's psychological well
being or cause physical symptoms or injuries.'''
The application of this general framework to the classes protected
under federal anti-discrimination law may vary,' 5 but the inclusion of
an objective reasonableness standard remains constant, even though
negligent individual could have foreseen such injury. W. PAGE KEETON E'r Al.., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON 'ME LAW or TORTS § 43, at 291-92 (5th ed. 1984).
Mentor Say, Bank, BB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1986).
12
 454 E2d 234, 237-39 (5th Cir. 1972). Rogers, which involved racial discrimination aimed
at a Hispanic employee, was the first case to recognize the actionability of a hostile work
environment under federal anti-discrimination laws. Id.
13 1-larris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Gt. 367, 370 (1993).
14 Id. at 370-71.
15 See. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370-71 (applying framework to sexual harassment claim, but
refusing to address the EEOC Proposed Guidelines, which apply a slightly different framework
to harassment aimed at members of other protected classes); EEOG Proposed Guidelines, supra
note 1, 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,267 (noting that the differing nature of sexual harassment and
harassment based on gender, race, color, religion, ethnicity, age or disability necessitates separate
guidelines for sexual harassment claims); Frank S. Ravitch, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation:
The Availability and Structure of a Cause of Action for Workplace Harassment Under the Americans
With Disabilities Act, 15 CARnozo L. REv. 1475 (1994) (the analytical structure applied to harass-
ment claims brought under the ADA must account for the unique concerns relating to disability
discrimination as well as the requirements of the ADA, and thus that structure will be slightly
different from that applied to other protected classes). However, the variation in the application
of the hostile work environment framework will generally be one of form, and not substance. See
EEOC: Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, 405 Fair Etnpl. Prac. Man. (BNA)
7165, 7167-70 (issued Mar. 8, 1994) (the Harris opinion is consistent with the framework applied
by the EEOC for determining whether a working environment is hostile to the classes protected
under the federal anti-discrimination statutes, and the "reasonable person" standard applied to
sexual harassment claims by the Harris Court should be interpreted to include consideration of
the victim's perspective so as to be consistent with the standards applied by the EEOC).
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the exact language used to express that standard does not.' 6
 The
objective reasonableness standard has a clear purpose—to protect em-
ployers from complaints raised by hypersensitive employees." The uni-
versal application of the objective reasonableness standard to eliminate
claims based on employee hypersensitivities conflicts with the man-
dates of federal anti-discrimination laws, 18
 and as discussed below, re-
quires the development of an exception to the objective reasonable-
ness standard.''
The issue of employer liability for a hostile work environment is
also germane to the application of that cause of action to hypersensi-
tive employees." The general rules applicable to employer liability for
hostile work environment claims bear on the development of any
exception to the objective reasonableness requirement. These general
rules also bear on the issue of the damages available to hypersensitive
employees subjected to an actionable hostile work environment, 2 ' and
to employer remedial action which could limit such damages. 22
According to the EEOC, an employer is liable for hostile work
environment harassment performed by its agents or supervisory em-
ployees when the harasser is acting in an agency capacity, or when the
employer knew or should have known of the conduct and failed to take
immediate and appropriate corrective action." It is presumed that a
supervisory employee has apparent authority, and thus is acting in an
1 " See Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370-71 (applying a reasonable person standard in the sexual
harassment context); Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1462-64 (9th Cir. 1994)
(applying test set forth in Harris, but utilizing reasonable woman standard, thus acknowledging
that "reasonable person" language in Harris might indeed mean reasonable woman when victim
is female); Ravitch, supra note 15, at 1505-09 (suggesting a reasonable person with the same
disability standard for harassment aimed at disabled employees).
17 See supra note 5.
18 See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also infra part II.
18 That standard is set forth supra in part II.D.
211 See infra parts 11.D, Ill.
21 See infra part III.
22 See infra notes 33-36, 76-77 and accompanying text.
28
 EEOC: Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, 405 Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 6695,
6699 (issued Mar. 19, 1990) (setting forth standard in sexual harassment context); see also EEOC
Proposed Guidelines, supra note 1, 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,269 (applying same standard to gender,
race, religion, national origin, age and disability) (withdrawn, 59 Fed. Reg. 51,396 (Oct. 11, 1994),
for reasons unrelated to employer liability provisions). Although the proposed guidelines applied
the same standards for employer liability for hostile work environment to all protected classes
including age and disability, it is important to note that victims of age and disability discrimination
are protected under different statutes, and thus in such cases the standards must be modified to
meet the requirements of those statutes. See Ravitch, supra note 15, at 1504-09 (EEOC Proposed
Guidelines and Title VII standards for employer liability must be altered or augmented to meet
statutory requirements of ADA).
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agency capacity, when the employer does not have in place a harass-
ment policy or appropriate complaint procedures. 24 Employers are
liable for the conduct of co-workers where the employer, its agents, or
supervisory personnel knew or should have known of the conduct, and
the employer failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective
action. 25
 Employers can also be liable for the acts of non-employees
when the employer, its agents, or supervisory personnel, knew or
should have known of the alleged conduct, and failed to take immedi-
ate and appropriate corrective action. 26
Some confusion has arisen as a result of language contained in
the EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex. 27
 Those guide-
lines set forth a similar standard for determining employer liability for
harassment,28
 with an important exception: the sexual harassment guide-
lines suggest that employers are strictly liable for the acts of supervisors
and agents. 29 However, in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, the
Supreme Court indicated that general agency principles should be
applied in sexual harassment cases to determine employer liability for
supervisory actions. 8° Courts have followed the Supreme Court's ad-
vice, and have looked to agency principles to determine such liability. 3'
Likewise, as demonstrated by the standard set forth in EEOC Policy
Guidance, the EEOC has backed away from its initial stance regarding
strict employer liability for the acts of supervisors."
24 EEOC: Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, 405 Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) at
6697-98; EEOC Proposed Guidelines, supra note 1, 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,269.
25
 Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1422 (7th Cir. 1986); EEOC: Policy Guid-
ance on Sexual Harassment, 405 Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) at 6695.
26
 Magnuson v. Peak Technical Servs., Inc., 808 E Supp. 500 (E.D. Va. 1992); EEOC Guide-
lines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (1993); EEOC Proposed Guide-
lines, supra note 1, 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,269.
27
 EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1993).
28 Id, § 1604.11 (c)—(e) .
25 Id. § 1604.11 ( c).
30 477 U.S. 57, 69-73 (1986).
31 See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881-83 (9th Cir. 1991); Andrews v. City of Philadel-
phia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1486 (3d Cir. 1990); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1015-16 (8th
Cir. 1988).
32
 In 1990, the EEOC issued policy guidance in regard to sexual harassment claims. That
guidance expressly incorporates agency principles into its analysis of employer liability for super-
visory actions that contribute to or create a hostile work environment. EEOC: Policy Guidance
on Sexual Harassment, 405 Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 6681, 6693-99 (issued Mar. 19, 1990);
see also supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text. Factors to be considered in determining
employer liability include: (1) whether the employer knew or should have known of the super-
visor's harassing conduct; and (2) whether a supervisory employee had "apparent authority."
EEOC: Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, 405 Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) at 6693-99.
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The EEOC also provides guidance regarding measures an em-
ployer can take to help avoid liability and eliminate harassment."
Employers should take all steps necessary to prevent harassment, such
as affirmatively raising the subject, expressing strong disapproval, pro-
viding sensitivity training and implementing and disseminating appro-
priate harassment policies, sanctions and complaint procedures.TM Some
courts have addressed the adequacy of employer remedial action,"
while other courts have addressed the adequacy of employer harass-
ment policies. 36
33 See, e.g., EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. at § 1604.11(d)
and (I); EEOC: Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, 405 Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) at
6697-701. Additionally, case law has addressed this issue. See, e.g., Ellison, 924 F.2d at 881-83;
Giandano v. William Patterson College, 804 F. Supp. 637, 643-44 (D.NJ. 1992); United States v.
City of Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612, 632-35 (W.D.N.Y. 1978), modified in part, 633 F.2d 643 (2d Cir.
1980).
See EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. at § 1609.2(d) and (f);
EEOC: Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, 405 Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) at 6697-701.
35 For example, in Barrett v. Omaha National Bank, the court held that a full investigation
of a complaint of harassment, followed by a reprimand and the placement of the harasser on
ninety-day probation with a warning that further misconduct would result in discharge, was
sufficient to remedy a hostile work environment. 726 F.2d 424, 427-28 (8th Cir. 1984). In Katz
v. Dole, the court held that an employer may avoid liability if it takes steps "reasonably calculated
to end the harassment," and that the employer in that case took sufficient action to avoid vicarious
liability by fully investigating the allegations, issuing written warnings to stop discriminatory
conduct, and telling the harasser that a subsequent act of harassment would result in suspension.
709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983).
More generalized criteria for evaluating the appropriateness of employer remedial actions
were set forth in Ellison, 924 F.2d at 882. Despite the fact that there was insufficient evidence in
Ellison's case to determine whether the employer's response was sufficient to avoid vicarious
liability, the court clarified the standards for determining such liability generally. Id. at 882-83.
First, not all harassment warrants dismissal of the harasser. Id. at 882. Second, employer remedial
action should be assessed proportionately to the seriousness of the offense. Id. (citing Dornhecker
v. Malibu Grand Prix Corp., 828 F.2d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 1987)). Third, an employer should impose
penalties sufficient "to assure a workplace free from" harassment. Id. Fourth, it would be inap-
propriate to transfer a victim of harassment out of a work environment in an attempt to stop the
harassment, because that would punish the victim for the harasser's conduct. Id. In addition, the
court noted that "Title VII requires more than a mere request" that the harasser refrain from
discriminatory conduct, and that unless an employer disciplines harassers, that employer sends
"the wrong message to potential harassers." Id. The court concisely stated the essence of the
criterion for determining the appropriateness of an employer's remedial action as follows:
Employers should impose sufficient penalties to assure a workplace free from sexual
harassment. In essence, then, we think that the reasonableness of an employer's
remedy will depend on its ability to stop harassment by the person who engaged in
harassment. In evaluating the adequacy of the remedy, the court may also take into
account the remedy's ability to persuade potential harassers to refrain from unlaw-
ful conduct.
Id.
'6 See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1510-12, 1517-19,
1537-38, 1541-46 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (holding that sexual harassment policies implemented by
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II. THE HYPERSENSITIVE EMPLOYEE AND THE OBJECTIVE
REASONABLENESS STANDARD: REMEDYING A SHORTCOMING IN THE
ANALYSIS OF HARASSMENT CLAIMS
A. Hypersensitive Employees Are Not Currently Protected Under the
Hostile Work Environment Cause of Action
The objective reasonableness standard applicable to all hostile
work environment claims is meant to protect employers from liability
for conduct that would only offend a hypersensitive employee." A
natural corollary of including an objective reasonableness standard in
the test applied to hostile work environment claims is that hypersensi-
tive employees are not protected from conduct that they perceive as
hostile or abusive based on their membership in a protected class, to
the extent that those perceptions are based on the hypersensitivity. 38
At first glance this seems a logical rule which should be applied uni-
versally.
However, if an employer could avoid liability for harassment in-
flicted on a hypersensitive employee, which is intentionally aimed at
the hypersensitivity, hypersensitive individuals could legally be harassed
based on known, although objectively unreasonable, sensitivities with-
out redress. 39 When such harassment is aimed at an individual because
of his or her membership in a protected class, or involves sexual
conduct, the employer would escape liability under federal anti-dis-
crimination statutes, even when the victim's terms or conditions of
employment were altered based on impermissible criteria. In such a
employer were inadequate, and providing injunctive relief including order that employer imple-
ment appropriate sexual harassment policy as set forth by court in Appendix to decision).
37
 In discussing the objective reasonableness standard applicable to hostile work environment
claims, the court in Ellison held:
In order to shield employers from having to accommodate the idiosyncratic con-
cerns of the rare hyper-sensitive employee, we hold that a female plaintiff states a
prima fficie case of hostile work environment sexual harassment when she alleges
conduct which a reasonable woman would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment.
924 F.2d at 879 (footnotes omitted).
39 Id.
39 If the sensitivity constituted a disability under the test set forth in the ADA or Rehabilitation
Act, the harassment could be actionable as disability-based harassment. See, e.g., Ravitch, .supra
note 15, at 1475. However, the implication of the term "hypersensitivity" is that it refers to an
objectively unreasonable sensitivity not necessarily associated with a mental disability. Otherwise,
the specific disorder itself would be referred to (for example, paranoia, neurosis, etc.). Of course,
to the extent that a disability does make an individual overly sensitive, one suffering from an
unusual sensitivity related to a disability might be considered "hypersensitive."
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situation, the victim would not recover damages or secure injunctive
relief unless he or she could prove a common law tort claim, such as
intentional infliction of emotional distress, which is a much more
onerous burden than proving hostile work environment.°
Such a result is inconsistent with the federal anti-discrimination
statutes' prohibition against discrimination in the terms or conditions
of employment based on membership in a protected class,' which are
meant "to strike at all" disparate treatment of men and women in
employment. 42 It is also inconsistent with the underlying basis for the
hostile work environment cause of action: preventing the alteration of
a term or condition of employment by harassing conduct based on an
employee's membership in a protected class.°
Conversely, holding employers or their agents liable for conduct
that they did not know would offend a hypersensitive employee, or
which was not based on that employee's membership in a protected
class, would not further the goals of the federal anti-discrimination
statutes because such conduct would not discriminate on the basis of
the hypersensitive employee's membership in a protected class." Ad-
ditionally, the imposition of such liability would place an undue bur-
den on employers and alleged harassers, because they would never
know what conduct might constitute actionable harassment, and as a
result, would not know how to prevent such conduct from occurring.
Thus, any modification of the hostile work environment test to
allow consideration of conduct aimed at an employee's hypersensitivity
in appropriate situations must be carefully drawn to balance these
competing interests. It is useful to look at the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, which specifically addresses hypersen-
sitive individuals, in considering what, if any, modifications are appro-
priate . 45
4° Nicolle R. Lipper, Comment, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Comparative Study of
Great Britain and the United States, 13 Coml.. Lot. U. 293, 300-01 (1992).
41 See supra note 4.
42 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. CL 367, 370 (1993) (referring to Title VII's prohibition
on interference with terms or conditions of employment).
45 Id. at 570-71.
44 The federal anti-discrimination statutes relating to employment discrimination prohibit
employers from discriminating against employees because of their membership in a protected
class. See supra note 4. In the absence of such discrimination the protections accorded under
those statutes are inapplicable. Ii' conduct alleged by a hypersensitive employee in relation to a
harassment claim would not have created a hostile work environment for a reasonable person of
the alleged victim's class, and the alleged harasser had no way of knowing that the conduct would
offend the alleged victim, there would be no basis for finding discrimination based on member-
ship in a protected class. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
45 See supra note 8; infra part II.B.
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B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Intentional infliction of emotional distress or "outrage," as it is
sometimes called, is a common law tort theory which has gained
acceptance in many jurisdictions since the introduction of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts.4" The tort requires the intentional or reckless
infliction of severe emotional distress on an individual by extreme and
outrageous conduct.47
 For conduct to be extreme and outrageous it
must go "beyond all possible bounds of decency, and (must) be re-
garded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.""
Conduct can he intentional or reckless when the actor desires to inflict
severe emotional distress, knows severe emotional distress is substan-
tially certain to result from the conduct, or acts recklessly in deliberate
disregard of a high degree of probability that severe emotional distress
will follow.49
 Furthermore, emotional distress is only severe enough to
qualify under this theory when "the distress inflicted is so severe that
no reasonable man could be expected to endure it. "5" Iii this regard,
the intensity and duration of the distress are among the factors a court
should consider. 5 '
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress allows for
consideration of a victim's hypersensitivity when the person inflicting
the emotional distress knows of the hypersensitivity, but acts anyway."
Comment f to the Restatement (Second) of 'Arts provides:
The extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may
arise from the actor's knowledge that the other is peculiarly
susceptible to emotional distress, by reason of some physical
or mental condition or peculiarity. The conduct may become
heartless, flagrant, and outrageous when the actor proceeds
in the face of such knowledge, where it would not be so if he
did not know. It must be emphasized again, however, that
major outrage is essential to the tort; and the mere fact that
46 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
47 The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 'Foam § 46(1) stales: "(1) One who by extreme and
outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is
subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for
such bodily harm."
48 Id. at ont.
49 1d. at ord. i.
5* Id. at ant j.
51 Id.
52 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Tincrs § 46(1) ctnt.
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the actor knows that the other will regard the conduct as
insulting, or will have his feelings hurt, is not enough."
Courts upholding claims based on comment f have not required
that the victim have a clinically recognized mental or physical condi-
tion, but rather have focused on whether the defendant acted in the
face of knowledge that the victim had a peculiar sensitivity." The
conduct must also meet all the other requirements of intentional
infliction of emotional distress to be actionable. 55
 Courts have found
actionable conduct knowingly aimed at sensitivities such as sensitivity
about being photographed," sensitivity in regard to financial con-
cerns,57
 sensitivity engendered by a particular racial slur," and sensitivi-
ties related to recovery from a calamity."
"Id. Interestingly, the tort of offensive battery requires that conduct "be offensive to a
reasonable sense of personal dignity," not simply to one who is "unduly sensitive as to his personal
dignity." See id. § 19 cmt. a. The Restatement contains a caveat that reads as follows: "The institute
expresses no opinion as to whether the actor is liable if he inflicts upon another a contact which
he knows will be offensive to another's known but abnormally acute sense of personal dignity."
Id. at caveat to § 19. Thus, while the Restatement structure for the tort of offensive battery
specifically precludes claims by hypersensitive individuals when the offensiveness of the battery
was caused by the hypersensitivity, it does recognize the possibility that if the actor knows of the
hypersensitivity and acts to offend it, the actor may be liable.
How this concept should be applied will depend on how the courts of a given jurisdiction
interpret the tort of offensive battery. One possible basis for treating hypersensitive individuals
differently under offensive battery than under intentional infliction of emotional distress, despite
the caveat, is the concept of justification. One might be justified in causing a seemingly benign
contact that one knows will be offensive to another simply due to the other person's unusual
sensitivity. On the other hand, the nature of the conduct required for intentional infliction of
emotional distress precludes a justification defense because the required conduct is inherently
unjustified. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text (setting forth the nature of conduct
that will support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress). The same is true for
hostile work environment because conduct that rises to the level of creating a hostile work
environment could be considered inherently unjustified. See supra part I (discussing the level of
conduct necessary to create a hostile work environment).
54
 See, e.g., Muratore v. M/S Scotia Prince, 656 F. Supp. 471, 480-81 (D. Me. 1987); Simmons
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 641 F. Supp. 675, 683-84 (D. Colo. 1986); see also Alcorn v. Anbro
Eng'g, Inc., 468 P.2d 216, 218 (Cal. 1970) (reversing dismissal of claim based on racial slurs, in
part because defendants were aware of plaintiff's "particular susceptibility to emotional distress").
55 See Alcorn, 468 P.2d at 218-19. These requirements are a function of state law, which
generally relies on the REsTATENtENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. Id.
Muratore, 656 F. Supp. at 480-81.
57
 Symonds v. Mercury Say. & Loan Ass'n, 275 Cal. Rptr. 871, 878 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
58 See, e.g., Alcorn, 468 P.2d at 218-19; Dawson v. Zayre Dept. Stores, 499 A.2d 648, 651-53
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (Olszewski, J., dissenting). But see. Dawson, 499 A.2d at 649-50 (majority
holding that racial slur is not sufficiently outrageous to create liability for intentional infliction
of emotional distress); Lay v. Roux Lab., Inc., 379 So. 2d 451, 452-53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
(same).
59 See Simmons v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 641 F. Stipp, 675, 683-84 (D. Colo. 1986) (case
involving actions by insurance company toward insured while insured, who recently underwent
a calamity, was in therapy).
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C. Lessons Learned from the Treatment of Hypersensitive Individuals
Under the Theory of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
A standard, like the intentional infliction of emotional distress
standard, which provides relief to individuals who are subjected to
harmful conduct based on a sensitivity known to the actor which causes
those individuals severe emotional distress, evinces a distinct logic.°
Inflicting conduct that most people would not find distressing, with
the knowledge that the victim will find it extremely distressing, is
flagrant, heartless and outrageous, and thus should be a basis for
relief.6' This is so because no real difference distinguishes inflicting
extreme and outrageous conduct that one knows would cause severe
emotional distress in most people, and inflicting conduct that one
knows will have the same effect on a hypersensitive individual. 62
From a practical standpoint, the intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress standard allows hypersensitive individuals to obtain re-
dress for distress caused them in relation to a hypersensitivity only
when the actor knew of the hypersensitivity and acted anyway.° This
avoids the problem of rampant and unpredictable liability, while pre-
venting a would-be inflictor of distress from hiding behind the victim's
hypersensitivity when she utilizes that hypersensitivity as a mechanism
for inflicting harm on the victim," The tort standard punishes the
actor for conduct that would otherwise meet the requirements for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, while protecting from li-
ability individuals whose actions do not meet the necessary level of
culpability.° Thus, the standard provides an excellent model for a
modification to the hostile work environment cause of action.
66 For a discussion of this rule, see supra part II.B.
°Pursuant to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cunt. I, such flagrant, heartless and
outrageous conduct is actionable under the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
62 This is particularly so, because intent to cause the victim emotional distress is a key element
of the tort. See supra notes 49, 53 and accompanying text (discussing the intent requirement).
Thus, when one acts knowingly to inflict extreme emotional distress, it makes no difference
whether that distress is inflicted on the victim due to a known hypersensitivity or clue to knowledge
that the conduct would so distress most people. Under either circumstance, if the other require-
ments for the cause of action are met, liability should attach. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§46cmt. f.
63 The fact that the actor proceeded in the farce of a known hypersensitivity is the basis for
the protection provided to hypersensitive individuals tinder the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 46 colt. f.
64 See infra part III for a discussion of the concerns regarding rampant and unpredictable
liability which could result from providing redress to all hypersensitive individuals harmed in
relation to their hypersensitivity.
•This may provide little solace to a hypersensitive individual who is harmed by unknowing
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Further support for applying the intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress rule regarding hypersensitive individuals to hostile work
environment derives from the similarity between those theories. Both
focus in part on the intent or recklessness of the perpetrator; inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress focuses on the intentional or
reckless infliction of severe emotional distress on an individual, 66 and
hostile work environment focuses on the harassment of an employee
or employees because of membership in a protected class. 67 In fact,
prior to the establishment of the hostile work environment cause of
action, victims of workplace harassment often had to rely on inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress to obtain relief"
D. Providing a Workable Framework to Protect Hypersensitive Employees
To allow an employer to escape liability for conduct aimed at an
employee because of his or her membership in a protected class simply
because the harasser knows that the victim has an unusual sensitivity
and aims the conduct at that sensitivity would violate the prohibition of
conduct. However, the requirement that the actor have knowledge of the sensitivity giving rise to
emotional distress is necessary to avoid unpredictable and rampant liability being imposed on
individuals who had no intention m inflict emotional distress. Moreover, even if such intent were
not required, it would likely strain the bounds of negligence law to argue that an individual who
had no knowledge of another's peculiar sensitivity, and acted in a manner which reasonable
people would not expect to present a risk of causing distress, should be held liable for his or her
actions. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Towrs § 313 (1965) (applying to negligent infliction of
emotional distress, and noting that actions causing unintentional emotional distress are not
actionable unless the actor should have realized his or her conduct involved an unreasonable
risk of causing the distress). For a summary of general negligence law and concerns regarding
the concept of foreseeability, see Leon Green, Note, Foreseeabilily in Negligence Law, 61 CoLust.
L. REV. 1401 (1961).
66 See supra part ILE.
°Significantly, in the context of an objectively hostile work environment, the harasser need
not intend to discriminate or create a hostile work environment so long as an objectively
reasonable person would perceive the conduct to create such an environment. Ellison v. Brady,
924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991). If the conduct rises to the level necessary to create a hostile
work environment, it is arguably action which the harasser is substantially certain will upset the
victim, or which was undertaken in deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability that a
hostile work environment would he created for the victim—the required standard for proving
recklessness under intentional infliction of emotional distress. See supra note 49 and accompany-
ing text. However, a hostile work environment victim need not meet this intentional infliction of
emotional distress standard, or the other strict standards required to prove that tort. For example,
in the hostile work environment context the discriminatory conduct need not cause the level of
severe emotional distress required to prove intentional infliction of emotional distress, see supra
note 50 and accompanying text, it need only cause the complainant to perceive the working
environment as abusive. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370-71 (1993).
"Lipper, supra note 40, at 300-01. However, it was hard to prevail on such claims because
of the onerous standard applied to claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id.
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discrimination in the terms or conditions of employment contained in
the federal anti-discrimination statutes.° However, it would be equally
against the spirit of the federal anti-discrimination statutes to hold an
employer liable for conduct which a hypersensitive employee believes
altered a condition of his or her employment and created an abusive
work environment, if an objectively reasonable person would not have
found that to be so, and the alleged harasser could not have known
that his or her conduct would offend the victim's unique sensitivity."
Fortunately, the treatment of hypersensitive employees under the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress provides the basis for a
model which can balance these concerns, and which can be applied
consistently with the mandates of the federal anti-discrimination laws.
Thus, I propose a simple exception to the objective reasonable-
ness standard currently applied under the hostile work environment
theory. The test for hostile work environment as modified by this
exception would provide that when: (1) the harasser knows of the
unusual sensitivities of the complainant; (2) the harassment is aimed
at those sensitivities; (3) the harassment is aimed at the complainant
because of his or her membership in a protected class; (4) the conduct
is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter a term or condition of the
complainant's employment and create a hostile or abusive working
environment;7 ' and (5) the complainant subjectively perceived the
conduct to have created such an environment, liability for the creation
and maintenance of a hostile work environment can attach. Whether
or not the harasser had knowledge of the sensitivity should be deter-
mined in accordance with the Restatement (Second) of 'Arts § 46, com-
ment f, and cases interpreting that comment. 72
To establish employer liability for such harassment, the victim
would have to demonstrate that the employer had actual or construc-
tive knowledge of the particular sensitivity or sensitivities involved, and
that the victim was being harassed in regard to such sensitivity or
sensitivities," or that the harasser had apparent authority to act on
69 See supra note 4 and accompanying text; supra parts I, ILA,
70 See supra note 6.
71 The term "complainant's employment" is used to demonstrate that, once steps one through
three are proven, conduct is actionable if someone with complainant's sensitivities would find it
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter a term or condition of employment and create a hostile
or abusive working environment.
72
 For the full text of comment f, see supra note 53 and accompanying text.
This requirement is included because employers could not take appropriate remedial
action if they were unaware that the alleged conduct was affecting a hypersensitive employee, and
it would be impossible for employers to foresee and prevent harassment aimed at every possible
unique sensitivity employees could possess. However, as will he addressed below, if this exception
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behalf of the employer. 74
 If one of these grounds for employer liability
can be demonstrated, liability for the acts of co-employees, supervisors
and agents would be based on the same factors as in other hostile work
environment claims. 75
Under the framework generally applicable to the hostile work
environment cause of action, an employer can limit liability if it takes
appropriate remedial action and has an adequate harassment policy in
place. 76
 Conversely, as noted above, an employer can be held liable for
a hostile work environment where its remedial action or harassment
policy is inadequate." This principle should be extended to employer
liability for a hostile work environment actionable under the frame-
work set forth herein. Thus, it would be advisable for employers to
address this issue in their harassment policies. 78
The central requirements of the model set forth above are that
the victim can demonstrate the harasser both knew of the hypersensi-
to the objective reasonableness standard is recognized by the courts or legislature, employers
should include a provision in harassment policies addressing the issue. See infra note 78 and
accompanying text. Otherwise, their harassment policies might he deemed inadequate, and they
could be held liable whether or not they had knowledge of an employee's sensitivity, because
inadequate harassment policies can he grounds for vicarious employer liability, even when
upper-management does not have knowledge of the harassment giving rise to a claim. See EEOC:
Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, 405 Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (RNA) 6681, 6697-99 (issued
Mar. 19, 1990) (employers should have in place an effective harassment policy and complaint
procedure; the absence of "a strong, widely disseminated, and consistently enforced" harassment
policy, and "an effective complaint procedure," can clothe harassing conduct by supervisory
employees with apparent authority thus leading to vicarious employer liability); are also EEOG v.
Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1516 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that employer's policy against
discrimination and internal grievance procedure were inadequate to shield employer from
liability for sexual harassment in absence of policy specifically addressing such harassment
and providing appropriate complaint procedures); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760
F. Supp. 1486, 1510-12, 1517-19, 1537-38, 1541-46 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (holding that employer's
harassment policies were inadequate, and noting that "gap" in employer's original policy left
higher management unaware" of some incidents of harassment).
74 Apparent authority is an agency principle, which, in the harassment context, provides a
basis for employer liability for conduct by supervisory employees in the absence of actual or
constructive knowledge. See EEOC: Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, 405 Fair Empl. l'rac.
Man. (RNA) at 6697-98. Such liability can arise in the absence of an appropriate harassment
policy or complaint procedure. Id.
75 See supra part 1.
76 See EEOC: Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, 405 Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (TINA) at
6697-99 (an employer can "divest its supervisors of ... apparent authority"—which can support
vicarious employer liability—by implementing and maintaining an effective harassment policy
and complaint procedure).
77 See supra note 74. Of course, for liability to be imposed, the other requirements for proving
a hostile work envircmarient would have to be proven. See supra part I.
78
 As with other claims of workplace harassment, if the employer has adequate policies and
procedures in place, and takes immediate and appropriate remedial action upon learning of the
harassment, the employer might avoid liability. See supra notes 34-36, 74 and accompanying text.
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tivity and acted in a manner which exacerbated that sensitivity because
of the victim's membership in a protected class, thereby altering a term
or condition of the victim's employment. However, the conduct, and
thus the sensitivity, need not be directly related to a trait attributed to
the protected class, so long as the victim would not have been subjected
to the harassment "but for" his or her membership in the protected
class."
III. "EGGSHELL SKULL" HARASSMENT VICTIMS: DETERMINING
DAMAGES FOR THE HYPERSENSITIVE HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT
VICTIM
The development of the framework set forth in Part 11 raises an
important question—whether employees who prevail under that frame-
work should obtain redress for injury caused due to the exacerbation
of their hypersensitivities. The answer to this question is significant
because it implicates a second question, namely, whether individuals
should obtain redress for injury relating to a hypersensitivity, when that
injury is caused by an objectively hostile work environmentm and the
harasser did not know of the individual's sensitivity. Once again, tort
law is instructive.
The "eggshell skull" rule requires the imposition of liability for
injury resulting from negligent actions which exacerbate a unique
physical or emotional weakness or sensitivity of an injured party."'
Thus, the actor is liable for injury to a victim when his or her negli-
gence "operates upon a concealed physical condition . . a latent
disease, or susceptibility to disease," regardless of whether the actor
could have anticipated such injury." 2 Significantly, the "eggshell skull"
rule has been applied to latent mental disorders, which might be
implicated in the hostile work environment context, such as a neurotic
disposition."
79 See, e.g., Delgado v. Lehman, 665 F. Supp. 460,467-68 (E.D, Va. 1987) (noting actionability
of conduct aimed at individual because of her gender, but which was otherwise unrelated to
gender).
89
 In such a situation the issue would simply relate to damages since a work environment
which is reasonably perceived to he hostile could be actionable regardless of the construct
proposed in this Article.
I KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 43, at 291-92.
82 Id.
"Alexander v. Knight, 177 A.2d 142,147-48 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962). In Alexander, the appellate
court overturned an inadequate jury verdict in a case involving an automobile accident victim
whose neurotic disposition prolonged her recovery, because the jury did not appropriately
consider her injuries. Id. at 147. The court held that "[a] defendant is not relieved of responsi-
bility because his victim is of a neurotic predisposition." Id.
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The logic underlying the rule is essentially that one should take a
victim as one finds him." The rule functions to expand the damage
for which a negligent individual is liable when the victim suffers from
a latent condition or susceptibility to such a condition. 85
 In such cir-
cumstances, the harm to the victim's unusual condition is not relevant
until the defendant's negligence is established, and the actor need not
have prior knowledge of the condition." It makes sense to apply this
concept to injury resulting from the kind of behavior generally in-
volved in a hostile work environment.
This conclusion is bolstered by the law applicable to intentional
infliction of emotional distress, which makes the actor liable when he
or she causes severe emotional distress: "for such emotional distress,
and if bodily harm to the [victim] results from it, for such bodily
harm."87
 Thus, if a victim can make out a claim for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, the actor is liable for all the resulting harm,
whether emotional or physical." The requirement that the actor have
knowledge of a victim's hypersensitivity" is only relevant to determin-
ing whether conduct affecting such a sensitivity was extreme or outra-
geous enough to create liability for the tort. It does not preclude
redress for injury caused by objectively reasonable emotional distress
that exacerbates a latent sensitivity." Likewise, when the actor proceeds
despite knowledge of the victim's peculiar sensitivity, he or she is liable
for all injury resulting therefrom.g'
In the context of harassment intentionally aimed at an individual's
hypersensitivity because of that individual's membership in a protected
class, it makes sense to provide redress for injury that relates to the
hypersensitivity, even when the actor could not have predicted the
extent of that injury." Such injury is a logical result of subjecting an
individual with an unusual sensitivity to a situation so upsetting and
84 KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 43, at 291-92.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965).
" Id, § 46(1) & cmts. b, k.
89
	at cmt. f.
" See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
81 Comment f to § 46 must be applied in light of the mandate of § 46(1) of the Restatement,
which, as discussed above, provides redress for all injury resulting from an actionable claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) &
cmt. f; see also supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
92
 Of course, the victim should also have a remedy for injury arising from a hostile work
environment which is unrelated to the hypersensitivity, if such injury can be proven. The term
"injury," as used here, refers to physical harm, emotional harm or job detriment.
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harmful that it created an abusive working environment. Thus, the
"eggshell skull" rule can be applied to successful claims brought pur-
suant to the model set forth in Part IL
A tougher question is posed by the application of the "eggshell
skull" rule to hypersensitive employees subjected to an objectively
hostile work environment. To address this question, we must determine
whether prior knowledge of the hypersensitivity, which is required to
establish liability for harassment under the model set forth in this
Article,'" should be required to impose damages for injury arising from
a hypersensitivity affected by an objectively hostile work environment.
From a policy standpoint this poses a difficult question. On the one
hand, it makes good sense to impose liability for all injury caused by
harassing conduct, and compensatory and punitive damages, though
capped, are now available under several federal anti-discrimination
statutes. 94 On the other hand, the generally subjective nature of the
injuries caused by workplace harassment would enable victims to ob-
tain a windfall if they can demonstrate any unusual sensitivity that
could have been exacerbated by the harassment. Moreover, the nature
of employer liability for hostile work environment might make employ-
ers liable to pay such windfalls based on constructive knowledge of the
harassment, even in the absence of direct knowledge of the sensitivity. 95
Under the "eggshell skull" rule, lack of knowledge of the sensitivity
would be no defense to the imposition of damages. 9°
The law developed to date under the federal anti-discrimination
statutes provides little clarity on this issue. The damages provisions of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 do not address the issue." It is clear that
the objective reasonableness standard utilized by courts in analyzing
hostile work environment claims is meant to protect employers from
being liable for conduct which offends a hypersensitive individual
when the alleged harasser had no knowledge of the sensitivity. 98 How-
93 See supra part II.D.
94 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a (West Supp. 1994) (codification of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
damage provisions applicable to Title VII, the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, which allow for
compensatory and punitive damages under specified circumstances, and set forth caps for such
damages based on the size of the employer involved). Section 1981a does not apply to the ADEA.
95 See supra notes 20-36 and accompanying text (setting forth the test for employer liability
for hostile work environment harassment).
96 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
97 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a.
98 Id.; see also Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3d Gin 1990) ("the
objective standard protects the employer from the 'hypersensitive' employee"); EEOC: Policy
Guidance on Sexual Harassment, 405 Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 6681, 6689 (issued Mar. 19,
1990) (a work environment is not hostile unless an objectively reasonable person would so
perceive it; "the hypersensitive" should not be protected from "petty slights").
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ever, this does not answer the question of whether the employer should
be liable for injury related to an unknown hypersensitivity which was
caused by an objectively hostile work environment.
The federal anti-discrimination statutes, as amended by the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, evince an intent to make plaintiffs whole for any
emotional distress they suffer as a result of intentional discrimination s9
However, the specter of rampant and unpredictable liability might
arise from the recognition of damage claims based on the exacerbation
of hypersensitivities due to a hostile work environment. Congress has
addressed concerns about rampant employer liability based on subjec-
tive claims of emotional distress by placing caps on the damages avail-
able for such distress.m Therefore, the federal anti-discrimination leg-
islation evinces the conflict between the provision of appropriate
remedies to the victims of discrimination and the avoidance of unpre-
dictable liability.
In balancing these concerns in the context of hypersensitivities
exacerbated by an objectively hostile work environment, one must
consider the congressional mandate that individuals should not be
subjected to discrimination in the terms and conditions of employ-
ment.'°' Likewise, one must consider the underlying purpose of the
damages provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991— to provide redress
for the damage caused by discrimination when it occurs, and to deter
discriminatory conduct through exemplary damages. 1 °2
Considering these statutory mandates, as well as the competing
policies and concerns, it is appropriate to provide a remedy for injuries
resulting from a hypersensitivity that is exacerbated by an objectively
hostile work environment. In so concluding, one cannot ignore the
fact that the concerns regarding rampant and unpredictable liability
are substantially curbed by the caps on damages available under the
federal anti-discrimination statutes,mand the fact that injured employ-
ees must still make the appropriate showing to prove vicarious em-
ployer liability.'" Nor can one ignore the continued viability of the
99 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 added compensatory and punitive damages to the remedies
available under Title VII, the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. See 42 U.S.CA. § 1981a.
100 See supra note 94.
1 ° 1 42 U.S.CA. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (West 1981 & Supp. 1994).
102  See 42 U.S.CA. § 1981a.
103 Id. However, even in the absence of the caps on damages, 1 would have come to the same
conclusion. The other interests supporting the application of the "eggshell skull" rule to damages
resulting from a hostile work environment would still be compelling.
IC4 See supra parts I, II.D.
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defenses generally available in regard to hostile work environment
liability.' 05
Therefore, employers should be liable for the injury caused by an
objectively hostile work environment, even where the extent of that
injury could not be foreseen due to a latent condition of the victim.
Of course, the victim must still prove the existence of the alleged
sensitivity. 106 The considerable body of caselaw developed under the
"eggshell skull" rule will inform the application of that rule to condi-
tions or sensitivities exacerbated by an objectively hostile work environ-
m en t."7
W. CONCLUSION
As the law applicable to workplace harassment develops, new
issues are bound to arise. This is particularly true in regard to the
hostile work environment cause of action. It is essential to address
these emerging issues thoughtfully, according appropriate considera-
tion to the policies underlying the hostile work environment cause of
action, and the statutory provisions upon which it is based.
The objective reasonableness requirement of the hostile work
environment cause of action raises one such issue, because it univer-
sally requires the denial of relief to hypersensitive employees when the
work environments upon which their claims are based are not objec-
tively hostile. 108 This is so even when an alleged harasser has knowledge
of an employee's unusual sensitivity and acts based on a discriminatory
motive.' D9
This blanket prohibition of relief violates the mandates of the
anti-discrimination laws that give rise to hostile work environment.'"
Circumstances may arise where a work environment perceived by a
hypersensitive employee as hostile, but which is not objectively hostile,
should be actionable because it is created or perpetuated based on the
105 See supra part 1.
"This is a logical requirement. Without it, anyone who successfully proves an objectively
hostile work environment could testify or introduce other evidence that they suffered serious
emotional harm or other injury as the result of an unusual sensitivity affected by the harassment,
without ever having to prove the existence of such harm or injury. This is not 0 concern if the
hostile work environment is based on exacerbation of a hypersensitivity under the framework set
forth herein, because in such a case the existence of the sensitivity will have already been
established in proving the existence of the hostile work environment.
107 See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text..
115 See supra part II.A.
I u9 See supra part
IS See supra part ILA.
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employee's membership in a protected class. This Article has created
an exception to the objective reasonableness requirement, which bal-
ances the need to provide redress to hypersensitive employees in ap-
propriate situations with policy concerns regarding rampant and un-
predictable employer liability, by developing a model based on the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress. That model limits liabil-
ity to knowing harassment of hypersensitive employees due to their
membership in a protected class."' Such an exception to the objective
reasonableness standard will further the goals of the federal anti-dis-
crimination laws applicable to employment by closing a potential loop-
hole in the hostile work environment cause of action.
A natural corollary to the provision of such an exception is the
determination of damages for hypersensitive employees who prevail
under it, as well as for hypersensitive employees who prevail in regard
to objectively hostile work environments. Since hypersensitive employ-
ees have been precluded from redress for claims based on their un-
usual sensitivities, these issues have not been adequately addressed.
This Article sets forth a framework for determining the scope of the
damages available to hypersensitive employees who prevail on hostile
work environment claims by looking to the "eggshell skull" rule estab-
lished in tort law." 2 That rule can be applied both to claims made
pursuant to the exception to the objective reasonableness standard set
forth in this Article, and to claims based on objectively hostile work
environments.'" Thus, it provides a consistent method for determin-
ing damages arising from actionable hostile work environment claims
brought by hypersensitive employees.
It is unlikely that the courts or the EEOC meant for the objective
reasonableness standard to be used as a means to protect those who
attempt to escape liability for harassment by utilizing an unusual sen-
sitivity as the tool for the harassment. The discussion set forth herein
attempts to provide a cogent method for addressing such situations,
with the hope of eliminating a potentially dangerous loophole in the
hostile work environment cause of action.
III See supra part II.D.
112 See supra part III.
See supra pan III.
